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ABSTRACT 
 The advent of 5G promises a new age of speed and connectivity of mobile 
devices. Location-based services will reach a new state of accuracy as well. 4G/LTE 
implemented the timing advance group (TAG) to increase throughput by allowing user 
equipment (UE) to connect to multiple base stations (BSs). Timing advance (TA) 
commands are utilized in order to maintain time synchronization between each servicing 
BS by directing when the UE should transmit based on the distance to each associated 
BS. For 4G/LTE, each TA is a multiple of 78.125 meters. As the subcarrier spacing 
increases in 5G, this distance resolution drops proportionately. These TA commands are 
sent frequently as the UE moves throughout the environment and are unencrypted. This 
opens the concern that if an adversary were to collect and correctly associate the TAGs of 
a specific target, they may be able to ascertain a position estimate using multilateration. 
The TAG exploit has been examined for 4G/LTE and has been shown to be significant, 
but the new subcarrier spacing for 5G theoretically will increase the fidelity with which 
locations can be determined. The focus of this thesis is to establish a Cramér-Rao Lower 
Bound (CRLB) for position estimates based on the TA commands for each of the 5G 
sub-carrier spacing and to implement and test an algorithm for finding a position estimate 
based on target TAs through simulation. 
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Fifth generation (5G) wireless technology is poised as the catalyst of the fourth industrial
revolution, describing a nigh inseparable and indistinguishable blending of the physical,
digital, and biological realms [1]. This will be accomplished through a myriad of ancillary
technologies, such as vehicle-to-everything (V2X), artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of
Things (IoT), Internet of Skills (IoS), augmented reality (AR), and Virtual Reality (VR),
resulting in an unprecedented level of connectivity encompassing every part of one’s public
and private life, with the primary enabler being the fully realized 5G network. The number
of connected devices globally is increasing every day. By 2023, projections indicate there
will be 29.3 billion devices connected to the global internet, with smartphones accounting
for 23%, or roughly 6.7 billion, of those. 1.4 billion connections will be facilitated by the 5G
network, an over 100-fold growth from 2019 [2], starkly showcasing the rapid rate of adop-
tion expected. As more devices are connected, with uses ranging from the expected (smart
phones, tablets, wearables) to the outlandish (homes, fridges, scales, aquariums), more of an
individual’s personal data is shared online, with or without their express knowledge, causing
the issues of privacy and security to become ever more salient. A niche area encompassing
the aforementioned, and the concern this thesis will address, is that of location privacy and
security in 5G.
Location privacy and security in Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks have been estab-
lished as being vulnerable in [3]. The authors of [3] show that unencrypted timing man-
agement signaling can be intercepted, and the information inherent exploited to discern
the location of a target user equipment (UE) within the network. The methods to conduct
timing management in 5G have changed little since their use in Global System for Mo-
bile Communications (GSM). In sustaining the vulnerability of plaintext transmission, and
through the introduction of the novel 5G sub-carrier spacings (SCSs), coined “numerol-
ogy,” this problem may have been exacerbated. We believe the goal of understanding the
vulnerability’s utility within the 5G realm is exactly in step with the directives laid out in the
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National Strategy to Secure 5G [4], the National Cyber Strategy [5], and the Department of
Defense (DoD) 5G Strategy [6], to either buttress our defenses or make use of it against our
adversaries.
1.2 Objective
In this thesis, we attempt to show that the timing advance (TA) command in 5G is vulner-
able to a multilateration localization attack. Furthermore, we show this results in higher
fidelity position estimates in comparison to a similar attack possible in LTE and is thus an
increased vulnerability. Once the vulnerability is explained, we will show that the results
are statistically efficient by establishing the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) for each
new SCS. Lastly, we will complete a comparative analysis on position accuracy with and
without the utilization of a localization enhancement algorithm, as presented in [7].
1.3 Chapter Breakdown
We discuss the previous works in multilateration localization and TA exploitation as well
as give the apposite 5G technical background to provide the details for understanding
and establishing the novelty of our efforts in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we will showcase
our simulation model, following with our results and analysis in Chapter 4. We finish in




In this chapter, we will discuss the relation of our work to the current overarching body
of research surrounding 5G and localization vulnerabilities as well as present the technical
overview of 5G necessary to best understand our assumptions, simulation design, and
analysis of results.
2.1 Literature Review
The development of techniques for discerning the location of a UE within the network
has been an ongoing process for nearly three decades. In 1996, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) mandated that a standardized accuracy requirement for localiza-
tion, primarily during Enhanced 911 (E-911) calls, be met [8]. These requirements have
been expounded upon, made more robust by further tightened position precision requisites
throughout the years. 2021 will mark the six-year benchmark for the fourth FCC report and
will call for nationwide providers to achieve 50-meter horizontal accuracy, 3-meter vertical
accuracy (z-axis capable devices), or a dispatchable location for 80% of all wireless 911
calls [9]. Localization edicts will continue to enlarge the scope and use of an individual’s
location data, setting the standard for industry within the United States and abroad.
There is an immense amount of research from industry and academia alike on methods for
positioning [10]–[13], leading to a plethora of procedures for various cases. Among these,
however, five fundamental techniques using radio signals can be broken out: trilateration,
triangulation, proximity, scene-analysis, and hybrid [14]. We focus exclusively on trilater-
ation, or more generally, multilateration for this investigation. Multilateration computes a
position estimate based on the intersection or distances between geometric structures (in
our case, rings) created by distance measurements (time of arrival (ToA), received sig-
nal strength (RSS), etc.) between a target UE and transmitter/receiver. Figure 2.1 clearly
displays this premise with respect to our particular circumstances.
3
Figure 2.1. An ideal visualization of trilateration in a wireless network, where
the intersections of the rings of uncertainty around each remote radio head
(RRH) (a 5G network access point) give the approximate position for the
target UE. Source: [15].
To match the ever-increasing localization requirements, operators have researched mobile
and network-based solutions alike. Through this, multilateration has been validated as
a real-world solution to meet regulations in a network-based context [16]. Using the data
available from the mobile network timingmanagement schema has been an obvious practice
from the beginning of the examination of UE localization and the rise of location-based
services (LBS). There has been starkly less focus in the security of the timing management
configuration, even following the revelation of the vulnerabilities, as discussed in Chapter 1.
This lack of interest may have come from the perceived severity of the vulnerability, with
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estimate error minimums reaching approximately 40 meters and maximums exceeding 120
meters, depending on network geometry and the use of localization enhancing techniques
[17]. With the protocol remaining unchanged as the world moves to 5G deployments, our
research will show that the severity of this privacy concern drastically increases.
Our chief concern, as stated in Chapter 1, is that this increase in position fidelity that can be
obtained by a motivated adversary, is directly linked to the decrease in privacy, specifically
location privacy, of any other user on the network they so choose to target. The concern for
privacy and security of the network is one shared by many. Security is featured as a key
performance indicator (KPI) for all standards development organizations (SDOs), and is an
objective of all governmental documents concerning the development of 5G. The questions
of what defines privacy, how it is changing in the era of 5G, how it is vulnerable, and
how to protect it are being constantly mulled about in the literature [18]–[21]. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Innovation Board published [22], lauding 5G for
the opportunities it provides and in contrast, plainly warning of an insecure future without
the concerted efforts of those pursuing these issues. Expanding further into the militaristic
realm, the potential for damage is clearly stated in [6]:
With persistent access to an ally’s 5G network, an adversary could potentially
engage in widespread espionage, threaten the privacy and rights of citizens
globally, prepare the operational environment to provide an advantage in armed
conflict, conduct information operations, and/or disrupt critical infrastructure.
2.2 5G Technical Background
The following is a relation of the standard 5G architecture, novel numerologies, as well as
timing management methodology.
2.2.1 Architecture
5G aspires to reach unparalleled levels of Ultra-reliable Low Latency (URLL), capacity,
cost effectiveness, and environmentally friendly communications [23]. To enable the em-
ployment of new spectral gains and take full advantage of the next-generation protocol,
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the legacy LTE radio access network (RAN) must be overhauled. To wit, the Cloud Ra-
dio Access Network (C-RAN) architecture was conceived, differing from the incumbent
architecture in two predominant ways: physical layout and interface design. The physical
makeup of a C-RAN is composed of numerous disaggregated, “dumb” RRHs, acting al-
most singularly as transceivers, connected via a fronthaul network to a grouping of baseband
units (BBUs), known as a “BBU pool.” Each pool will service a specific geographic region
and communicate with the Mobile Core Network (MCN), using the backhaul. This physical
separation lies in stark contrast to the LTE network, where the BBU and RRH are deployed
together as the base station, or eNodeB, as shown in Figure 2.2. Due to the distribution
of relatively cheap hardware, the consolidation of more expensive, energy-dependent hard-
ware, and aggregation of data and control, the C-RAN framework results in greater resource
efficiency and sharing, a decrease in Operational Expenditures (OpEx) and Capital Expen-
ditures (CapEx), and acts as an enabler to future use cases such as Virtualized Network
Functions (VNF), which are crucial to the advanced network management techniques (i.e.,
network slicing and on-demand functionality) 5G is capable of [24].
Figure 2.2. Simplified view of the LTE RAN fronthaul/backhaul.
Interface design in 5G is of critical importance to enabling the key metrics and desired
disaggregation. Common public radio interface (CPRI), the current design, is responsible
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for the digitized and serial internal base station interface between the BBU and RRH, as well
as transport, connectivity and control, covering the Physical and Data Link layers (Layers 1
and 2) of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. Essentially, CPRI is the method
in which the controlling unit (the BBU) communicates with and directs the radio unit (the
RRH). Updates to CPRI are necessary for use in a 5G C-RAN, as the version utilized
currently in LTE would require an unfeasible increase in capacity to maintain the proposed
data rates [25]. Original interfaces are being proffered by many of the major industry leaders
like Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP), and 5G Infrastructure Public-Private Partnership (5GPP), to provide a
workable solution. CPRI, the industry partnership responsible for the aforementioned LTE
interface, has responded with enhanced CPRI (eCPRI) [26]. All of the above efforts strive
to find a balance between latency, efficiency, and customizability, founded on a concept put
forth by the 3GPP: the physical layer split (PLS) architecture.
Figure 2.3. Proposed Physical Layer splits, where each box denotes layers
of the radio protocol stack, as well as some of their sublayers, that reside
specifically within the RAN. Source: [27].
As seen in Figure 2.3, PLS gives enumerated options for different network engineers and
operators to decide where they want to distribute various responsibilities; either the BBU or
RRH [27]. This allows for each network manager to choose which metrics of performance
are best suited for their network. In this thesis, we assume that our target network is operating
an eCPRI option 7/2 fronthaul/backhaul. Referencing Figure 2.3 again, a 7/2 option would
mean that all functions to the right of option 7 reside with the RRH, those that reside
between option 2 and 7 reside with the BBU, and those to the left of option 2 lie with the
MCN. Essentially, this option relegates all radio link control and media access control layer
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functions to the BBU, while lower functions (modulation, Fast Fourier Transforms (FFTs))
will be carried out by the RRH [28]. This effectively results in the BBU carrying out the
majority of the digital baseband radio functions, while the RRH focuses on analog frequency
tasks, allowing for cost-effective geographic separation. Figure 2.4 gives a combined view
of the architecture and interface of the target network.
Figure 2.4. Simplified view of the 5G C-RAN fronthaul/backhaul and asso-
ciated PLS. Source: [15].
2.2.2 Use of the Spectrum
Beginning with third generation (3G), each successive generation of telecommunications
has expanded the usable spectrum to increase capacity and alleviate congestion. 5G is
no different, offering two different spectrum allocations based on use case; “Sub-6” and
“mmWave”. “Sub-6” refers to carrier frequencies below 6 GHz, ranging from 450 MHz to
6 GHz. “Sub-6” will service less dense environments, with larger distances between RRHs,
and allow easy transition from, or be backward compatible with, current LTE serviceable
areas. The now colloquial “mmWave” stems from the wavelength of the transmitted signal,
covering spectrum from 24 GHz to 52 GHz, providing increased bandwidth and reduced
latency (see Figure 2.5).
8
Figure 2.5. 5G frequency allocation and comparison to LTE (show in log-
scale).
Just as in LTE before it, 5G will utilize Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplex-
ing (OFDM) and Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) modulation
schemes. OFDM uses multiple orthogonal subcarriers to transmit data symbols in parallel
(see Figure 2.6). These subcarriers are separated in LTE by a static SCS of 15 kHz; this is
where 5G differs greatly. 5G introduces flexible SCSs and symbol lengths as “numerolo-
gies”, represented as `, which ranges from 0 to 4 [29]. SCS is calculated as
(( = 15 × 2` kHz for ` ∈ [0, 4] . (2.1)
allowing for novel SCSs of 15 to 240 kHz1, visually shown in Figure 2.7. This increased
flexibility empowers efficient and novel use of the available spectrum, where generally,
higher SCS is used for shorter transmission times alongside mmWave, while lower SCS is
optimal for high throughput performance [30].
1480 kHz is the maximum SCS as of 3GPP Release 16; however, as it is meant for future study and is not
actually used at this time, it is not considered during this investigation.
9
Figure 2.6. Illustration of OFDM principle and overlap and interaction of
symbols. Source: [31].
Figure 2.7. Comparison of SCS size across novel numerologies.
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2.2.3 Timing Management
Control over time-domain resources within the OFDMA construct is pivotal in ensuring
proper network operation, especially when a single UE is communicating with multiple
RRHs. 5G, just as LTE before it, enacts this control via the TA command. The TA command
is made up of two notable parts, the TA value #) and the Timing Advance Group (TAG)
[32]. The purpose of the command is to ensure that as a UE moves within the serviceable
environment, its transmissions arrive at the RRH during its given time slot. As UE distances
vary, so too do the propagation times for its transmissions, often significantly. This requires
some method of synchronization.
The TAG is a 2-bit field that allows for the unique association of a TA command to one
of a maximum of four RRHs, to account for communication with multiple RRHs through
carrier aggregation [33] and the likely eventuality that they are not equidistant from the UE.




Δ 5A4 5 × # 5 ,A4 5
=
1
15 × 103 × 2048
≈ 32.6 nsec (2.2)
where Δ 5A4 5 is the LTE SCS and # 5 ,A4 5 the maximum number of subcarriers. TA values,
represented as integers, #), account for 16 time units such that
#) = 16)B . (2.3)





= 78.125 meters. (2.4)
In order to employ 5G numerologies, a new base unit of time was developed in [34]
)2 =
1
Δ 5<0G × # 5
=
1
480 × 103 × 4096
≈ .51 nsec (2.5)
where Δ 5<0G is the maximum SCS and # 5 the maximum number of subcarriers. The
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The basic time unit is redefined for 5G as
)B =
1
Δ 5A4 5 × # 5 ,A4 5
=
1
15 × 103 × 2` × 2048
(2.7)
where Δ 5A4 5 is the standard LTE SCS this time multiplied by 2` in order to achieve the





















directly conveying the dependence of 5G TA distance resolutions on the associated nu-
merology. Table 2.1 summarizes the new resolutions while Figure 2.8 admits a visual
understanding of the TA.
Table 2.1. 5G Numerology Distance Resolutions. Adapted from [35].







Figure 2.8. Visual representation of a TA command with TA = 2 and the
associated distances with ` = 0. Source: [15].
2.3 Statistical Efficiency
A keystone portion of our investigation is to determine whether the method of utilizing the
TA to localize a target UE results in a position maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). To
this end, we employed the CRLB: a mature method for ascertaining the minimum variance
of an unbiased parameter estimate. The bound is defined as
Var\{)} ≥ −1(\) (2.11)
where ) is an unbiased estimator of the parameter \ and  (\) is the Fisher information with
respect to \. In [17], the CRLB applicability in LTE TA localization has been established,
where ) is the UE position MLE and \ the parameter to be estimated. It also shows that for
TA distance resolution, A, the root mean square error (RMSE) is bounded by the CRLB for
A . 3.4f (2.12)
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where f is the standard deviation of distance error estimates. The work presented here is
the logical extension of this theory to 5G. Based on (2.12), Table 2.2 summarizes the values
of f for which we expect this to remain true. For instance, suppose a RRH operating with
` = 0 as in LTE can measure UE distance with a standard deviation of 20 meters. This being
the case, we can expect the distance error estimate to always be above the CRLB derived
from the distance estimation fidelity. However, the same bound may not apply for higher
numerologies. This will be further investigated through simulation in Chapters 3 and 4.








The Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement (CeSAR) algorithm is a technique for
improving the position MLE by way of the TA multilateration method, through the intro-
duction of secondary equipment for receipt of the target UE uplink burst to the RRH. This
provides another known distance to further increase position fidelity.
First, the sensor will listen for the primary and secondary synchronization signals (PSS/SSS)
from each RRH to establish downlink synchronization with the network. Downlink frame
timing is then estimated based on propagation delay between the sensor and the RRH.
The sensor now continues to listen to downlink frames until the one with the target cell-
radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) is identified. The C-RNTI is fundamentally a
unique temporary software address issued by the network to each UE, obfuscating the UE
identity. Once the target frame has been identified, the associated TA is stripped away and
converted to a distance measurement. This measurement is used to estimate the UE’s uplink
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transmission time. The sensor then observes the uplink burst timing information from one
of the serving RRHs. The algorithm will then compare the estimated UE transmission time,
with the observed timing of the transmission, and use the determined difference to calculate
the distance to the target UE from the sensor. Distance measurements are found for all
serving RRHs and finally a position estimate is found for the UE. This algorithm, as defined
in [7] is presented in Table 2.3 for brevity.
Table 2.3. Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement. Source: [7].
Step Procedure Description
1 CeSAR (p'' , pB4=B>A , target C-RNTI)
Passive enhancement procedure utilizing sensors, RRH’s and target cell-radio
network temporary identifier (C-RNTI).
2 function PSS/SSS SYNC Primary and secondary synchronization signal synchronization.
3 sensor← RRH downlink Sensor listens for the PSS/SSS from serving RRH.
4 end function
Steps 2-4 are required for synchronization of the sensor to the communicating
RRH to allow it to decode cell data.
5 repeat Repeat steps 2-4 for each RRH
6 G← observed C-RNTI Sensor will continue to decode packets.
7 until Sensor continues to search for target C-RNTI.
8 G == target C-RNTI The target UE downlink frame has been identified.
9 3̂8 ← TA × 78.125m The associated TA is stripped out and converted to a distance.
10 C ← TA estimate tx The TA is used to estimate the target UE’s uplink transmission time.
11 C′← observed observe true uplink timing information from one of the serving RRHs.
12 ΔC ← C′ − C
Utilize information from step 10 to measure the propagation delay from the
UE to the sensor.
13 3̂′ = ΔC × 2 Convert to a distance measurement.
14 d̂ ← [3̂, ..., ˆ3# , 3̂′])
Additional distance measurement is now added to the distance measurement
obtained from the serving RRHs.
15 p̂ = arg min ? (d̂ |d) Uses step 14 to find a MLE.
16 end procedure END
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the fundamental requisite topics for a more complete com-
prehension of the simulation parameters, testing method, and results. Particularly, we gave
an overview of 5G architecture, novel use of the spectrum and introduction of numerologies,
and timing management method. We then review statistical efficiency, the CRLB, and the
CeSAR algorithm. Next, we introduce the four guiding questions of our research, and the
simulations derived there from.
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In an effort to thoroughly elucidate our objective as denoted in 1.2, we ran 4 similar, yet
distinctly separate simulations aimed at answering the following questions:
1. How do the number of RRHs collecting and the numerology in use affect the location
estimates?
2. What effect does f have on localization efficiency?
3. How does the positioning algorithm perform in three dimensional space and how
does the use of the CeSAR algorithm affect positioning across all numerologies?
4. What would a multilateration attack within a C-RAN architecture look like in a
real-world deployment?
In this Chapter, we will discuss the setup of each of these simulations in turn, with their
respective results and analysis being discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1 Simulation of RRH and Numerology Effects
The experimental setup for this simulation is established in [35], and reiterated here for
clarity and ease of understanding. To answer the first question, we select our two main
parameters for testing, specifically, the number of RRHs the UE is in communication with
and the numerology in use. We chose to limit the number of RRHs to 2, 3, or 4, which
can be supported by the use of the TAG. We then send each of the possible combinations
of number of RRHs and numerology in use through our simulation. First, we generate
a 100, 000 km2 area to place our RRHs and UE. The UE is always placed at (0,0) (the
center point of the area), while the locations of the RRHs were modeled as uniform random
variables and placed within the testing area. Second, we calculated the TA value assigned
to the UE from each RRH. For example, if the UE is in communication with 2 RRHs,
then there will be 2 TA values, each associated to their own RRH. If 3 RRHs are in use
then 3 TA values will be present, and so on. Now that there is an associated TA value for
each supporting RRH, we have effectively created rings of uncertainty, with a width equal
to the distance resolution of the particular numerology in use, around each RRH. These
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rings account for all possible locations of the UE. From here it can be discerned that the
UE would be inside, or on the boundary of, the intersection of each ring (see 2.1 for a
visual representation of this concept). To estimate the position of the UE, p̂, we utilized
the Non-Linear Least Squares (NLLS) method presented in [10], [36]. This involves the
minimization of x = [G, ~]) in the following




[38 − ‖x − xi ‖]2 (3.1)
where p̂ = [Ĝ, ~̂]) , 38 is the distance fromeachRRH to the center of its TA ring, xi = [G8, ~8])
are the positions of each RRH, 8 an integer value from 1 to # representative of the total
number of supporting RRHs. We ran the NLLS algorithm with the starting position being
the actual position of the UE (0,0), and then measured the deviation from that point once
it converged. This distance between the NLLS solution and the UE is our final distance
error. For simplicity and clarity, this model assumes no error due to noisy conditions. This
means that the perceived distance of the UE to the RRH is not shifted due to noise, and
the only error accrued is due to the quantization of the distance measurements into the TA
values. This focuses the effect of SCS on distance resolution and localization. We simulate
the above across each combination of number of RRHs to SCS, and then generate their
respective cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) to compare performance (as shown in
Section 4.1).
3.2 Simulation of Statistical Efficiency
In Chapter 2, we discuss the CRLB, as well as its use for determining efficiency of lo-
calization estimates within the 5G network. Here, we will observe the effect of varying f
across a range of values on localization efficiency, based on the difference between estimate
mean squared error (MSE) and the CRLB. For this simulation we begin by establishing
our wireless architecture in much the same fashion as the first, however we’ve reduced the
deployment area2 to 1 km2, and use the maximum number of RRHs (4), for each simulation.
We chose to use the maximum number of RRHs for consistency across values of f, as well
2Due to our assumption of a lossless transmission, the larger distances do not have any effect on the
simulation, so we shrank the deployment area for ease of examination.
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as to see the results aligned with the best case scenario. The true distances from the RRHs
to the UE were computed and introduced to Gaussian noise, to form our distance estimates,
3̂8. These were then quantized into their respective TAs. We again find p̂ using (3.1). Once
found, the squared distance error, error2
3
, is determined by squaring the assessed distance
between p̂ and the true UE position, p. Now that the position error for that trial has been
evaluated, we find the CRLB. Applying (2.11), we state that the MSE for p̂ is bounded by
Var{ p̂} ≥ O−1(x) (3.2)
































and CRLB = CA ( O−1) , where CA () is the trace of the matrix, defined as the summation of
elements along the main diagonal from upper left to lower right. Next, we calculate the







We then conducted this procedure per each numerology, for values of f ranging from 1 to
30. This range was chosen in order to show how the estimates trend for each numerology as
they approach and exceed the values presented in Table 2.2. Lastly, the average ediffCRLB is
found for each value of f.
3Due to the CRLB being particular to each iteration based on the relative distances from RRHs to UE,
normalizing by the CRLB is required to compare across trials.
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3.3 Simulation for Determining R3 and CeSAR Applica-
bility
To test the potential gains of CeSAR enhancement pairedwith the novel 5G numerologies, as
well as showing the localization effectiveness in R3, we modified our scheme by uniformly
distributing and selecting 4 RRHs and 1 UE within our deployment area, with heights also
being uniformly distributed in the range of 0 to 400 feet. We then follow a similar procedure
as Section 3.2, solving (3.1), without CeSAR enhancement, while selecting values of f
that meet the CRLB for each numerology (further explanation can be found in Section 4.2).
These findings were then enhanced by adding a single CeSAR sensor, via the same method
as described in Table 2.3. For the purpose of this simulation, steps 1-13 of the algorithmwere
assumed to have been completed, and we applied the true distance measurement between
sensor and UE, vice the distancemeasurement calculated in step 13. This additional distance
measurement is combined with those calculated previously and the now enhanced MLE is
determined as before.
3.4 Simulation of Real-World Use Cases
The final simulation conducted was of a localization attack on the island of Kauai (the
location was chosen to facilitate discussion for the 54th Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences, which was held in Kauai). The simulation was broken in to two
different wireless architectures: the first being a current in-place setup, the second being
a vision of the ultra-dense (UD) 5G deployment to come (as seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively). The choice to separate architectures is based on the particular use cases for
the numerologies, where in the “in-place” case numerologies 0-2 will be utilized, while
3 and 4 will be used for the UD deployment. This is justified in that the distance of the
RRH to the target for the “in-place” case is ≈ 2.96 km which is not conducive to millimeter
wave (mmWave) communications. The “in-place” case uses the location of an operational
5G tower, with CeSAR sensors placed based on topography and angle from the projected
position of the UE. The UD architecture is somewhat arbitrary, having an emphasis on
having near line-of-sight conditions within the observable area as would be necessary for a
mmWave UD network.
The UE, RRHs, and CeSAR sensors were plotted in Google Earth to obtain global posi-
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tioning system (GPS) coordinates, which were then converted to their values in meters. The
CeSAR enhanced algorithm was used to find position estimate for the current architecture
( ` = 0 : 2), while the standard NLLS algorithm solved for the UD deployment (` = 3 : 4).
The reason for not running the UD network through the enhanced algorithm is the low
probability of properly positioning a sensor to receive mmWave communications. Without
already having a solid estimate of the UE position, the extremely small beam-width and
controlled directionality inherent to mmWave communications, would make positioning
non-trivial. Also, even if correct positioning were achieved, the sensor would have to be
practically co-linear to the communicating RRH. This would result in little to no extra
information being provided, as the distance estimate created would be nearly the exact same
as that created without the CeSAR sensor due to the sensor and the RRH being in-line. An
angular difference between the placement of the sensor and the RRH will result in greater
information as the angle increases. Figure 3.1 gives an example of how this process works,
and shows visually why the case of an offset sensor is desirable.
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Figure 3.1. The left-hand image shows that when the sensor, represented by
the microphone, is co-linear to the receiving RRH, the estimate it provides
is no different than that provided by the two RRH on their own. This results
in an erroneous position, shown as the red dot. The right-hand image shows
that if we move the sensor to a location that is offset from the RRHs, the
estimate shifts as well. We can see from the now greyed out TA ring and
sensor that the new estimate, highlighted in green, does still fall along that
original estimate as it should, though its true position was different then
originally estimated.
In order to find the MLE of the target position, this procedure must then be repeated
numerous times.
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Figure 3.2. Real-world deployment on Kauai. Source: [15].
Figure 3.3. UD deployment on Kauai. Source: [15].
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3.5 Summary
We have now introduced our four guiding questions, and the simulations constructed to
answer those questions. Specifically, the questions are: how do the number of RRHs and
numerology in use affect positioning accuracy, how does f affect localization efficiency,
how does the algorithm perform in R3 with and without CeSAR enhancement, and finally
how does our algorithm perform in actual wireless deployments? Next, we will discuss the




Now that our simulation environments have been established, in this chapter we will go
through the results and answers to our four guiding questions. Monte Carlo trials for
simulations were run no less than 100,000 times.
4.1 Simulation of RRH and Numerology Effects
For this simulation, we expected that position accuracy would increase as the number of
RRHs increase and/or as the SCS becomes larger, and our results showed just that. The
CDFs shown in Figures 4.1– 4.3, illustrate how sharp a performance increase comes with
the novel numerologies introduced in 5G.
Figure 4.1. CDFs of location error across all numerologies when receiving
TA data from two RRHs communicating with the target UE. Source: [35].
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Figure 4.2. CDFs of location error across all numerologies when receiving
TA data from three RRHs communicating with the target UE. Source [35].
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Figure 4.3. CDFs of location error across all numerologies when receiving
TA data from four RRHs communicating with the target UE. Source: [35].
Delving further, in Tables 4.1– 4.3 we tabulated the 90% and 95% circular error probable
(CEP) values for each of the RRH combinations. It can be seen that the trend from one
numerology to the next, for every number of RRH, is approximately halving the location
error. The least accurate scenario occurs with 2 RRHs and ` = 0, whereas the most accurate
scenario is 4 RRHs and ` = 4, where a target UE could be localized to within 3.1 meters
with 95% confidence. Comparing performance between the 2 RRH scenario with that of
both 3 and 4, we see that at a 90% confidence there is an average performance increase
of 67% and 75.95%, respectively. At 95% confidence this further escalates to 76.4% and
85.3%, demonstrating that in either case there is dramatic improvement in localization with
the addition of a RRH. Comparing solely between 3 and 4 RRH cases, we see a surge in
performance at both the 90% and 95% confidence levels of 27.1% and 37.5%, respectively.
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0 15 168.72 317.46
1 30 85.41 165.71
2 60 42.98 84.42
3 120 21.50 42.48
4 240 10.75 21.36










0 15 56.29 78.57
1 30 28.21 39.33
2 60 14.14 19.71
3 120 7.06 9.85
4 240 3.53 4.92
28










0 15 41.18 49.12
1 30 20.57 24.61
2 60 10.29 12.27
3 120 5.14 6.14
4 240 2.57 3.08
TheCEP for six different cases are presented in Figures 4.4– 4.6. TheCEP relates confidence
location error and location distance error, and is another simplemethod of depicting location
accuracy [37]. The different cases are a combination of 2, 3, or 4 RRHs and the lowest and
highest numerologies, thereby comparing the highest and lowest position fidelity for each
number of RRHs in use. The UE’s position is normalized to the center of the graph and
is displayed as a red asterisk. Blue markers indicate estimated positions over 1,000 trials
(this number was chosen arbitrarily for demonstration). The red rings delineate the area
within which we can say with 95% confidence that the target resides. Graphs were scaled
to properly show distinction of the circle and surrounding points. Differences in accuracy
become clear when observing this difference in scale per graph.
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90% CEP with 2 RRH ( =0)
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90% CEP with 2 RRH ( =4)
Figure 4.4. 90% CEP using 2 RRH with numerologies ` = 0 and ` = 4. Axes
have been scaled appropriately based on the SCS in use for ease of viewing.
Source: [35].
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90% CEP with 3 RRH ( =0)
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90% CEP with 3 RRH ( =4)
Figure 4.5. 90% CEP using 3 RRH with numerologies ` = 0 and ` = 4. Axes





























90% CEP with 4 RRH ( =0)
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90% CEP with 4 RRH ( =4)
Figure 4.6. 90% CEP using 4 RRH with numerologies ` = 0 and ` = 4. Axes
have been scaled appropriately based on the SCS in use for ease of viewing.
Source: [35].
4.2 Simulation of Statistical Efficiency
In order to determine the statistical efficiency of the localization algorithm, we chose to
compare theMSE of our distance estimates to the CRLB at varying values off, as discussed
in Section 3.2. Figure 4.7 presents the results of this investigation, where the y-axis is the
difference between the MSE and the CRLB for every f value along the x-axis. The figure
shows that for each numerology as f increases, ediffCRLB (determined by (3.4)), approaches
0. Vertical dotted lines indicate the expected value off from Table 2.2 to which theMSE for
that numerology would meet the CRLB, based on the theoretical bounding of A . 3.4f (as
described in Section 2.3) The results addweight to the theory as each numerology performed
closely, and met the CRLB, producing baseline values of f that return the most statistically
efficient location estimate per numerology chosen. What is perhaps even more interesting,
is that these results suggest that the CRLB will be the lower bound for the localization MSE
for all values of f, and that as f becomes large, the MSE meets the CRLB. This differs
from the inequality discussed for LTE. We believe the reason for this divergence is based on
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simulation differences between this work and that of [17]. The latter performed an analysis
based on many trials where the position of the UE does not change and is either in the center
of a TA ring, or on the edges. When the UE is exactly in the center of a TA ring, the distance
estimate matches that of the quantized TA value. For example, assuming ` = 0, if the UE
is located exactly in the center of the TA = 2 ring, then the actual UE distance from the
RRH of 156.25 m will exactly equal that of the TA = 2 bin, resulting in no shift and no loss
in accuracy of the follow-on estimate. If however, the UE was located on the edge of the
ring, then the actual distance of ≈ 118 m would end up being shifted 38 m when quantized
by the TA = 2 TA command. A UE located on the edge of a TA ring can be considered
the worst case scenario for the algorithm to estimate, while being located in the center can
be considered the best; therefore, the comparison of both is effectively examining the two
extremes. The authors’ results show that in these two cases, as the ratio of g to f increases,
where g is the estimated value of a random variable4, the RMSE for each case split away
from one another concluding with one increasing and the other decreasing past the CRLB at
≈ 3.4f (see Figure 4.8). This bifurcation supports (2.12). However, in our examination the
location of the UE within each TA annulus was random based on the uniform distribution
of RRHs for each trial. We believe that this randomness resulted in the CRLB being a valid
lower bound for all values of f. In fact, giving Figure 4.8 a more thorough examination, it
would appear that if one took the average of the normalized RMSE between each case, the
result would be values that were above or nearly equal to the CRLB for any ratio of g to f.
These results are formally defined in the following conjecture.













≥ 0 ∀ A
f
This presents a novel understanding of the relationship between the CRLB and TA local-
ization estimation that demands further evaluation than what is simply provided here.
4This is the equivalent of A , or the distance resolution for each numerology, in our case
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Figure 4.7. Difference between MSE and CRLB for each SCS across f values.
Source: [15].
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Figure 4.8. A numerical study where the mean value of a latent random
variable is estimated with the quantized realization of the latent random
variable. The study is repeated across two different cases, where there is
no shift due to quantization (d=0) and where there is the worst case shift
(d=g/2). Source: [17].
4.3 Simulation for Determining R3 and CeSAR Applica-
bility
Table 4.4 summarizes the results for this simulation. The effectiveness of the algorithm to
facilitate localization within R3 is shown under the “Standard” column. To properly frame
these results we must compare them to the results for Simulation A, in Section 4.1, which
examines the algorithms effectiveness in R2. When comparing Tables 4.4 and 4.3, it can be
seen that, though there were 4 RRHs in use for both simulations, the algorithm effectiveness
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was greatly reduced in three dimensional space, due to the addition of the height parameter
to be estimated. In fact, if we next compare Tables 4.4 and 4.1, we observe that the results
are similar to that of when only two RRHs are used. This equates to nearly an order of
magnitude decrease in localization accuracy for all SCSs. It is noteworthy, however, that
when going from 90% CEP to 95%, the position error increase (≈ 27%) was substantially
subdued in comparison to the increase that occurs when only 2 RRHs are used (≈ 88%).
The CDFs for ` = 0 and ` = 4, as seen in Figure 4.9, portray a marked increase in accuracy
when using the CeSAR algorithm. Taking a closer look at the 90% and 95% CEPs for each
numerology presented, at the worst point accuracy increases by ≈ 20% (` = 0) and ≈ 40%
(` = 4). Both5 of these surges in fidelity are significant and support the use of CeSAR to
augment TA-based multilateration attacks in 5G.
Figure 4.9. CDFs for both standard and CeSAR implementations for ` = 0
and ` = 4. Source: [15].
5For this simulation we looked at all numerologies, but as mentioned in Section 3.4 we believe that the
use of CeSAR at numerologies greater than ` = 0 : 2 would be non-trivial in practice at its best.
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Table 4.4. CEPs across each numerology in R3, depicting a substantial de-
crease in localization accuracy for the standard algorithm, while highlighting
the boon to accuracy provided by the CeSAR enhancement. Source: [15].
- Standard CeSAR enhanced
CEP = 90% (m) CEP = 95% (m) CEP = 90% (m) CEP = 95% (m)
0 150.42 190.38 121.47 150.39
1 86.68 112.60 65.35 81.84
2 47.41 62.93 34.17 43.08
3 25.12 34.06 17.45 22.11
4 13.00 18.02 8.87 11.28
4.4 Simulation of Real-world Use Cases
For the Kauai-based deployment, the position estimate errors for ` = 0 : 2 were 30.12 m,
12.36 m, and 5.40 m on average. In the case of the UD deployment they were 8.64 m and
4.02 m. The final location estimates are rendered in Figure 4.10, with cyanmarkers denoting
current system estimates, and pink UD system estimate. The spacing of the cyan markers
as nigh linear and equidistant which begins at the ` = 0 marker was an interesting result.
We believe this is due entirely to the CeSAR sensors’ distance estimates independence from
noise, as well as how the sensors were placed in the environment. The UD deployment
errors were consistent with expectations from the three previous results.
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Figure 4.10. Position estimates for target UE. Source: [15].
4.5 Summary
Referring back to our four guiding questions in Chapter 3, we can now provide the following
insight:
1. The number of RRHs and numerology in use affect the location estimates. As either
increase, so too does the accuracy of the estimates. The most accurate localizations
occur when 4 RRHs are in communication with the UE using the largest numerology
(` = 4).
2. As f increases, localization statistical efficiency increases as well, where the MSE
of position estimates come to meet the CRLB across all numerologies. We also show
numerically that in the case presented in the Conjecture, this is true across all values
of f.
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3. The positioning algorithm performs significantly worse in R3 than in R2 (see Fig-
ure 4.4), especially at the lower numerologies. At higher numerologies, this method
can still be considered effective with position errors being within 20 meters. The
CeSAR algorithm will improve positioning across all numerologies. However, the
use of CeSAR at numerologies greater than ` = 0 : 2 is not practical, due to the
physical limitations of signal collection at higher frequencies, in a setting using the
procedure described in Table 2.3.
4. Our simulated environment showcased the effectiveness of our methods using actual
5G deployment locations on the island of Kauai mixed with simulated CeSAR re-
ceivers, as well as a simulated UD environment. The results from this were consistent
with expectations laid out by the previous simulations’ findings, giving credence to
the algorithms efficacy when used with real wireless network deployment geometries.
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Here we have extended work presented in [17] to 5G. We now conclude with recommenda-
tions for future work.
5.1 Final Thoughts
This thesis has shown that in using the aggregated unencrypted TA commands of a target
UE, an adversary can calculate a MLE of the target position, in short order. The speed
and accuracy of this attack leads us to believe it would be quite possible to utilize this
procedure for not only a localization attack, but tracking the UE as it moves through the
environment. Therefore, we believe that as 5G technologies continue to come online, an
end user’s location privacy will be at even greater risk.
5.2 Recommendations for Follow-on Research
The major limitation of this study is that it had to be done entirely in simulation. The
next logical step would be to conduct this attack in an operational 5G test bed, using both
static UEs as well as those dynamically moving at varying velocities, testing how well the
algorithm can localize a target from real signals. It would also be worthwhile to continue
evaluating the algorithm efficacy as a tracking attack. Similarly, further investigation of the
effects of f on the efficiency of the algorithm is needed. We speculated that when observing
a randomized UE location, the CRLB applies for all values of f; however, a mathematical
proof is needed to cement this notion.
Another worthwhile endeavor would be to investigate whether or not location accuracy
will saturate based on the number of RRHs and/or CeSAR sensors in use in R3. This is
of particular interest as in R2, the benefit of adding extra sensors past the maximum of
4 utilized by the network gives little increase to localization accuracy, and thus saturates
very quickly. However, as shown in Simulation C (Section 4.3), the addition of a sensor
resulted in a moderately large increase in fidelity in R3. We postulate that the addition of the
vertical axis allows for many more possible sensor locations that do not result in co-linear
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arrangements with the other sensors, providing solid information and enhancing the end
estimate for each sensor added, up to a point. Defining what that point is would be valuable
in determining proper deployment of the algorithm for each real-world use case.
A final area would be to investigate mitigation techniques. The difficulty here lies in that
obvious efforts to mitigate this vulnerability reduce some of the major boons of 5G. If
the TA is encrypted, this will increase latency, especially at times when the UE is moving
through the environment and is receiving TAs often. If the PLS split is altered so that Layer 2
functionality is included at the RRH, this would allow for eCPRI built-in security measures
associated with Internet Protocol (IP) (IPsec) and Ethernet (MACsec) to be implemented
when sending data across the fronthaul. However, this added complexity will increase
CapEx and OpEx, resulting in an increase in cost for network managers and end users
alike, dispelling support for this option. Other, clever modalities for securely transferring
fronthaul data, or specifically the TA information would be a major accomplishment.
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